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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 18-3509 
_______________ 
 
GABRIEL ROBERT GONZALEZ, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
  
SUPERINTENDENT HOUTZDALE SCI; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-02029) 
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
January 17, 2020  
_______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 4, 2020) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
______________ 
 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Gabriel Gonzalez appeals the District Court’s an order denying his 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 habeas petition. Gonzalez’s counsel in his state postconviction proceedings 
procedurally defaulted Gonzalez’s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance. A federal court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction in habeas proceedings to consider 
a procedurally defaulted claim. See Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064–65 (2017). 
Gonzalez maintains that we should excuse his procedural default under an equitable 
exception. We will not excuse the default, so we will affirm the District Court. 
I 
In March 2000, police arrested Gabriel Gonzalez for theft. While the police 
detained Gonzalez at the local precinct, they received an anonymous tip about a 
suspected murder of a pizza delivery man. Upon interrogation, Gonzalez confessed to the 
crime. Before trial, Gonzalez’s trial counsel moved to suppress Gonzalez’s confession. 
The state trial court denied the motion. 
At trial, Gonzalez called three witnesses, including an attorney who met him at the 
police station after his interrogation. None of the witnesses testified that Gonzalez had a 
reputation as a peaceful, honest, or law-abiding person. At the end of trial, the jury 
convicted Gonzalez of second-degree murder, burglary, and possession of an instrument 
of crime, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Gonzalez retained new counsel for his direct appeal. Under Pennsylvania 
procedural rules in effect at that time (“pre-Grant regime”), Gonzalez raised claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687, 695 
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n.6 (Pa. 1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).1 
Gonzalez claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call 
any character witnesses. On appeal, Gonzalez submitted at least twelve affidavits from 
various witnesses attesting to his good character. The Pennsylvania appellate court denied 
the claim principally because the declarants’ statements “constitute[d] individual 
opinions” about Gonzalez’s “peaceful nature and would have been inadmissible at trial.” 
A1232. Gonzalez sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but it denied him 
permission to appeal. 
Gonzalez filed a pro se habeas petition under Pennsylvania’s Postconviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”). The PCRA court appointed counsel for him. His PCRA counsel filed an 
amended PCRA petition. Neither of Gonzalez’s PCRA petitions raised an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on the lack of character evidence introduced at 
trial. Gonzalez’s PCRA petition failed. 
 Next, Gonzalez filed a pro se § 2254 petition in the District Court. The District 
Court eventually appointed counsel, who filed an amended § 2254 petition. Gonzalez’s 
amended § 2254 petition tries to remedy the inadmissibility of the character-witness 
affidavits he submitted in support of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on 
direct appeal. 
                                              
1 During the pre-Grant regime, a criminal defendant had to raise an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim as soon as his ineffective counsel no longer represented 
him. See Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 695 n.6. If trial counsel served as appellate counsel, a 
criminal defendant could wait until a state postconviction proceeding to raise an 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. One year after Gonzalez’s direct appeal, 
Pennsylvania adopted a new rule. See Grant, 813 A.2d at 738. 
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 Gonzalez supported his amended § 2254 petition with five affidavits obtained in 
2016 from character witnesses. Four of the witnesses “provided earlier affidavits” for 
Gonzalez’s direct appeal, but the earlier affidavits “did not state that the[ ] witnesses 
knew Mr. Gonzalez’s reputation in the community for being peaceful, law-abiding, or 
honest.” Appellant Br. at 16 n.4. 
 The District Court denied Gonzalez’s § 2254 petition without considering whether 
the exception to procedural default established in Martinez v. Ryan applied. 566 U.S. 1 
(2012). The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation did not consider the 2016 
affidavits “because they were not presented to and considered by the state court during 
the review of [Gonzalez’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel] claim.” A28 n.15. 
Finally, the District Court issued a certificate of appealability for Gonzalez’s ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Gonzalez timely appealed. 
II2 
Gonzalez concedes that he procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claim. Appellant’s Br. 25–30. Ordinarily, attorney error committed by 
defense counsel during state postconviction proceedings is not “cause to excuse a 
procedural default.” Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065. This general rule is subject to a narrow 
equitable exception. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17. Gonzalez’s appeal ultimately turns on 
                                              
2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253. When the District Court 
decides a habeas petition under § 2254 based on the state-court record, we review the 
District Court’s decision de novo. Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260, 
263 (3d Cir. 2019). 
5 
 
one issue: whether the narrow equitable exception for procedurally defaulted claims 
established by Martinez—and expanded by Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013)—
applies to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 
The Martinez exception has four prongs. The fourth prong—which serves as a 
threshold issue in Gonzalez’s case—asks whether state law precluded or effectively 
prohibited a criminal defendant from raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claim on direct review. See Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065. The fourth prong covers two 
scenarios. First, when state law or procedures require ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims to be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding. Martinez, 566 U.S. 
at 17. Second, when the state procedural framework’s design or operation “makes it 
highly unlikely” that a typical defendant “will have a meaningful opportunity to raise” an 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. Trevino, 569 U.S. at 429. 
Gonzalez’s case does not present either scenario. 
First, Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant regime did not require Gonzalez to raise an 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a postconviction proceeding. Martinez 
applies when “state law requires prisoners to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel ‘in an initial-review collateral proceeding,’ rather than on direct appeal.” Davila, 
137 S. Ct. at 2065 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant regime 
required the opposite in Gonzalez’s case. It required Gonzalez to raise his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel “at the earliest stage of the proceedings at which the 
allegedly ineffective counsel no longer represent[ed] [him],” which was the direct appeal. 
See Grant, 813 A.2d at 729. Thus, Pennsylvania law did not require Gonzalez to raise his 
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ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in “the ‘initial’ review proceeding.” See 
Trevino, 569 U.S. at 423 (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14).  
Second, the design or operation of Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant regime did not likely 
deprive a typical defendant of a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim. Trevino extended the Martinez exception’s fourth prong to cases in 
which a state prisoner could bring an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on 
direct appeal, but the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, 
[made] it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant [would] have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” 569 U.S. at 429.  
Gonzalez could—and did—raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim 
on direct appeal. See A1188–91. Finding that it was “virtually impossible” for Gonzalez 
to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal would defy logic 
when he, in fact, raised the claim on direct appeal. See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 119 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Trevino, 569 U.S. at 417).  
At least one other circuit court of appeals has found that the Martinez exception 
does not apply when a defendant brought an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim 
on direct appeal. See Moore v. Mitchell, 848 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2017) (declining to 
consider Trevino because “not only does Ohio’s procedural regime make it possible for [a 
criminal defendant] to present an [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel] claim on direct 
review, [this criminal defendant] actually brought such a claim on direct review.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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 Gonzalez does not show that, in a typical case, raising an ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claim on direct appeal in the pre-Grant scheme was “virtually impossible.” 
See Cox, 757 F.3d at 119 (quoting Trevino, 569 U.S. at 417). He points out that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulties imposed on appellate counsel 
by requiring them to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. 
But a difficult process is not a “virtually impossible” one. 
 And Trevino’s reasoning does not apply to Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant regime. In 
Trevino, the Supreme Court analyzed several factors to find that Texas’s scheme for 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal deprived a criminal 
defendant of a meaningful opportunity to bring such claims. The factors included: 
procedural rules for developing a record of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; the state 
appellate court’s preference for ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to be raised 
in collateral proceedings; the practice of the state’s defense counsel; and procedures for 
raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. Trevino, 569 
U.S. at 424–27. Gonzalez does not show that these factors were present in Pennsylvania’s 
pre-Grant regime—much less that it is “highly unlikely” in a “typical case” that a 
defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim would receive meaningful 
review.3 
                                              
3 For example, a state procedural framework may preclude meaningful review if, because 
of time constraints, appellate counsel cannot gather affidavits to support an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. But, here, Gonzalez’s appellate counsel obtained at 
least twelve character-witness affidavits. He just failed to draft them in a way that would 
make them admissible. 
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Ultimately, Gonzalez does not argue that he was precluded from raising an 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Rather, Gonzalez seems intent to “turn 
Martinez into a route to circumvent [Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011)]”—which 
limits § 2254 review to the state-court record—and to receive permission “to obtain new 
facts to challenge” the state court’s “rejection of his [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel] claim.” See Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 785 (6th Cir. 2013). In particular, 
he wants to introduce new character evidence—i.e., the 2016 affidavits.  
 Under Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant regime, Gonzalez raised an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. The claim failed, in part, because his 
appellate counsel inartfully drafted the character witness affidavits. The poorly drafted 
witness affidavits—and not Pennsylvania’s procedural scheme—foreclosed Gonzalez’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. Because state law did not 
“explicitly or effectively foreclose[ ] review of the claim on direct appeal,” the Martinez 
exception for procedurally defaulted claims does not apply. See Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 
2066. 
* * * 
 The District Court properly denied Gonzalez’s § 2254 habeas petition. We will 
affirm the District Court’s order.  
                                              
And regardless of the poor drafting, Gonzalez’s appellate counsel knew to bring 
the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. Cf. Trevino, 569 U.S. at 
426–27 (discussing the defense bar’s practices under Texas’s scheme). This shows that, 
at the least, Gonzalez’s appellate counsel did not believe that raising the ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal under the pre-Grant regime was 
“virtually impossible.” See Cox, 757 F.3d at 119 (quoting Trevino, 569 U.S. at 417). 
